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Abstract. The aim of the article was to assess Poland capabilities as a regional player in gas supply 
diversification projects in Central and Eastern Europe.  The article is a  contribution to a pan-European 
discussion on energy security and depoliticisation of the EU- Russia relations.  Poland, due to its 
geographical location and access to the Baltic Sea, may yet play an important role in the regional 
diversification projects of gas supplies for the rest of Central Europe. The article concludes following: 
(1) Poland becomes an important participator and initiator of regional gas diversification projects in 
East-Central Europe, (2) Thanks to the investment in Świnoujście, Poland may become an active 
participant in the new gas layout in Europe, (3) Russia is and will remain an important exporter of 
natural gas to Europe; however, extension of LNG terminals in the Baltic Sea will allow a more 
flexible gas import policy.   
 






With over 500 million potential customers, the European Union is the largest regional market, 
responsible for 20% of world energy usage, which makes it one of the most prominent energy 
importers worldwide. The EU – especially its Eastern part - remains heavily dependent on importing 
fuels. In the Baltic states and the southern Central and Eastern Europe (author refers to: Latvia 
Lithuania Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) barriers 
between energy systems are more widespread and persistent. For the first time, however, the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe endeavour to real cooperation exiting out of paper political 
declarations, as it is shown by initiatives of building energy infrastructure interconnections (Joint 
Statement 2015; Marzecki 2013). Such Cooperation can lead to establishing and enhance a sustainable 
economic development in whole Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).  
 
The aim of an article is to present the Poland’s importance as a regional player actively aiming at 
increasing the energy security in the gas sector.  Poland, together with its partners from the Visegrád 
Four  countries (V4), must take all measures necessary to expand the gas transmission  and 
interconnection infrastructure. This will significantly help to facilitate  a safety of the gas supplies in 
the region; however, appropriate mechanisms must be in place to lobby the European Commission in 
Brussels for financial support for these investments. 
 
This study addresses the important research problem of how to improve the energy security of the 
CEE region.  The study was based on analysis of import dependency indicator, and impact of gas 
infrastructure investments in Poland on regional gas transit capabilities. The  objective was to answer 
the following two research questions: 
1. What is the real position of the Russian supplier on the European gas market, and in the CEE 
region in particular? 
2. Whether the Świnoujście LNG terminal has a potential to allow Poland became the regional 
natural gas distribution center for Central and Eastern Europe?  
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3. To what extent LNG affects the gas security in Central and Eastern Europe?  
4. What are the prospects of cooperation in the gas transmission between Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans countries? 
5. What is the Russian response to recent developments in Polish LNG strategy?   
 
1.1 The problem of gas sector diversification in Central and Eastern European countries   
 
The European Union is searching for means to depoliticise gas relations with Russia, and counteract 
its dependence on the dominating supplier. At the same time, due to geographical closeness, the EU is 
practically forced to be dependent on Russia. In the EU-28 Gross Primary Inland Consumption of gas 
is up 23%, wherein the import dependency ratio is 67% (as of 2014) and it is projected to continue 
increase. Most of the raw material comes from Russia - which is the most important provider of the 
natural gas - almost 40% of EU gas imports in 2013 (Statistical Pocketbook 2015, 26, 44). The role of 
Russia as the natural gas exporter for the EU according to predictions is going to grow, and in 2030 it 
will reach half of the 84% of the import needs of the EU (European Communities 2008, 13). This 
shows the quite huge fuel dependence of the EU and its member states, thus forcing the members to 
look for ways to diversify supplies.   
 
The main weakness of the EU’s energy policy is the lack of a common supply strategy of Member 
States mainly due to differences in the gas import scale but also the different ratio of  supplies 
diversification. The main receiver of Russian gas is Western Europe (namely the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Italy), consuming as much as 2/3 of the Russian gas at the European market (Germany 
and Italy alone consist more than half of the import to EU-15). Consequently, the EU-13 states are 
economically nearly irrelevant for Gazprom1
 
.  
The issue of safety and diversification of gas supplies is especially vital in Central and Eastern Europe 
separated from the Western countries by a “gas curtain”. This is due to the fact that while the EU-15 
has a greatly developed diversification structure of supply directions, the “new Europe” states still 
remained dependent on one supplier, i.e. Russia. The gas import balance of the EU-15 shows on 
average a 20% involvement of Russia and for the CEE states it  ranges from 65% to 100% (see Fig. 1). 
Russia is still the gas monopolist for the Visegrád Four (V4) leading to a great political vulnerability 
of the region, Central and Eastern Europe region is fully dependent on Russian gas, and history shows 
that this supplier is unstable and uses its resources as a tool of political pressure.  
 
According to the estimates of the European Commission, the increase in demand for natural gas in the 
East-Central European states (excluding the Baltic states), in comparison to the values in 2009, is 
going to amount to between 23 billion m3 and 33 billion m3 in the period 2020–2030. The demand of 
Poland, Hungary and Romania constitutes ca. 2/3 of the whole demand of the CEE  countries. Such a 
high dependence on the import of natural gas from a single source may be treated as a threat to the 
safety of country energy supplies. A poorly diversified structure of supplies and the low development 
level of an energy infrastructure, including cross-border links in the region, does not make the 
situation any better.  
 
Therefore question comes how then to strengthen the gas sector diversification  within the V4 and 
Balkans states? The gas markets in the V4 states are too centralised and monopolised, and there is a 
lack of competition of supply. In the region of south-eastern Europe, central-eastern Europe, and the 
Baltic, many countries are heavily dependent on a single gas supplier, and would, therefore be the 
hardest hit in case of a supply crisis.While the North-West European gas markets are competitive and 
well-connected, with access to several sources of natural gas – including a number of terminals with 
substantial capacity to import LNG – markets of the Baltic, central-eastern, south-eastern and south-
western regions are less developed. The new EU’s energy strategy sees a solution for these issues in 
308
 
the expansion of LNG terminals (EU, 2016). The global LNG market is undergoing a dynamic 
development, already playing a significant role in EU gas supplies, and could become more important 
over the coming years2
 
. Poland due to its geopolitical position and access to the Baltic Sea may play 
an important role in the diversification of natural gas supplies in the Baltic region and the creation of 
new routes and sources of gas supplies to CEE states, connecting them with the Balkan countries 
transmission infrastructure. Therefore, recent Polish investments increase the diversification of gas 
supplies in the Baltic Sea region and Central and Eastern Europe, although the necessary condition for 
increasing the energy security of the CEE countries is to increase the infrastructural connections in the 
region which mean network its markets (by interconnectors), and strengthen cooperation between 
companies with similar interests. 
The results presented in this paper are autor’s own analysis based on documentary review (Polish 
energy companies strategies, reports and government documents, press releases and monographs 
(Młynarski 2011) in the period of 2011-2016. The research was undertaken, in part because of the 
major impact of the Świnaoujście LNG terminal construction to the import circumstances and energy 
security in Poland. According to T. Boersma (2015, XI, XII), around 90% of Polish natural gas 
demand can be covered by sources other than Russian gas. The author conducted an analysis of the 
conditions of Poland’s and regional natural gas consumption and import needs. As a result,  the scale 
of dependence on gas imports from Russia was identified. Then a brief description of  Polish activities 
taken for diversification and development of infrastructure of gas import and transit of gas was 
completed.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses the empirical 
evidence from the literature, methodology and hypotheses. The third section presents the background 
data and statistics. The fourth section assesses the potential impact of the construction of an 
independent gas import infrastructure in Poland to reduce import dependency of CEE countries. The 
fifth section shortly discusses Russia’s strategy to counter de-monopolization of the regional gas 
market and the sixth section concludes. Author’s finding is that there is a great potential to reduce 
import dependence on Russia either for Poland and with the usage of Polish transmission networks 
throughout the region, and for the Baltic states, V4, and in the long run even for the Balkan states. 
 
The main motivation for writing this paper was that fact that Poland was the first time through 
building  Świnoujście LNG terminal gained a real tool to reduce its dependence on Russian natural 
gas, and making a real change in the prevailing from decades scheme of dependence. Poland aims at 
becoming a regional leader in cooperation and integration of energy systems. The article is part of the 
ongoing debate on the de-politicization of EU gas relations with Russia and shows directions of 
actions to be taken to achieve this goal. 
 
1.2 Brief literature review, methodology, and hypotheses 
 
An important aspect of energy security research is to analyze the key sources of diversification, and 
country own potential of mineral resources, and to outline the prospects for new inter-countries 
connections. Problem of reducing European dependence on Russian gas – to separate natural gas 
security from geopolitics – was analyzed by the author in the monograph (Młynarski, 2011, 178-180).  
 
The issue of instrumentalization of hydrocarbons usage for geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons is 
widely discussed in the European and world literature. The importance of energy resources as an 
instrument of political influence in the modern world and shaping assumptions of (geo)strategies of 
international life participants in various parts of the world was analyzed by G. Luft, A. Korin (2009).  
Their studies showed that Russia aims at regaining a political and economic impact over the so-called 
“near abroad” using variable energy resources as a geopolitical tool. P. Högselius (2013) observed that 
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Russian natural gas has become an „energy weapon” analogous to the OPEC’s oil weapon and argued 
that such a weapon might be – and is possibly already being – used not only against Ukraine and 
others former soviet republics but also against Western Europe. The Author concluded that  energy is  
one of many fields in  which international trade is not a “purely economic” phenomenon. R. Dickel et. 
al, (2014) in their report proved that the main additional source of non-Russian gas for Europe up to 
2030 will be LNG. The authors also highlighted that countries with strong geopolitical fears related to 
Russian gas dependence will need to either terminate or not renew on expiry, their long-term contracts 
with Gazprom. This will result in substantial additional infrastructure costs for LNG import terminals 
and pipeline connections, or investments in alternative energy sources, energy conservation, and 
efficiency measures. 
 
Dependence of the former Soviet republics from Russia and their importance as a transit way for 
hydrocarbons from the East to the West was analyzed by Margarita M. Balmaceda (2012). T. Boersma 
(2015) investigated that integrating EU markets and enhancing cooperation between members states is 
the most efficient tool to enhance energy security and additional incentives for gas infrastructure 
development are needed in parts of the EU. T. Boersma emphasizes that Poland, which has, rightly or 
not, been one of the most vocal member states when it comes to the dangers of dependence on natural 
gas from Russia, has in just a couple of years’ time and with the support of EU funding, developed 
additional interconnection facilities with neighboring countries, most prominently Germany.  
 
In this research paper the author applied research methodology typical for political sciences, using 
empirical observations and statistical analysis of gas demand data and by examining conditions, the 
potential of Poland energy resources and determinants shaping the Polish energy policy in the context 
of import dependence of natural gas from Russia. Results helped to identify opportunities for 
diversification of natural gas supplies in the Baltic Sea region and Central and Eastern Europe. The 
author also used the method of statistical comparison in relation to the assessment of the degree of 
differentiation of the “old” and “new” EU countries  from Russia. To discuss relations between the EU 
- Germany - Russia the historical-comparative method was used, which allowed explaining 
contingency of Central European countries from Russia and attempts taken to depoliticise the 
relationships in the gas sector. 
 
In connection with the considerations above the following hypothesis is formulated: 1). Poland, 
despite active efforts to use its geopolitical situation will not become a gas hub for the CEE countries, 
mainly due to powerful prevention actions that were taken by Russia (completion of the NS2 
pipeline); 2). Construction of the LNG gas terminal will strengthen the Polish negotiating position 
towards Gazprom and for the first time will release Poland from the  Russia gas supply monopoly; 3). 
To what extent the CEE countries will benefit from the possibility to diversify gas supply depends 
mainly on their political will because the technical conditions have been created by Poland.  
 
 
2 Background data: Poland’s gas resources and the ambitions to became a regional gas hub 
 
Energy security of Poland is based on coal, being a basis of county energy security since 87% of 
electricity produced in 2014 was obtained from it. Nevertheless natural gas role in the country’s 
economy increasingly grows up. Natural gas resources in Poland amount to 132 billion m3 (2014). The 
share of gas in the national energy consumption is 24%, while coal up 55%. In 2015 domestic 
extraction of natural gas (4.5 billion m3) covered almost 1/3 of the annual demand (approx. 16 billion 
m3 of gas per year). The remaining part was obtained from imports, mainly from Russia, (about 9.2 
billion m3). Assuming that domestic production remains constant at approx. 4.5 billion m3, import 




Gas imports from Russia is completed under the so-called Yamal Contract - prolonged to 2022. Under 
the terms of this agreement, natural gas from Russia to Poland (and further to Germany) flows along 
two routes: from the territory of Belarus through the Yamal-Europe pipeline and from the territory of 
Ukraine (approx. 3.8 billion m3). The remaining part of natural gas, thanks to the recent years 
extension of cross-border interconnectors comes from Germany (approx. 2 billion m3) and Czech 
Republic (0.5 billion m3).  
 
There were several investments completed between 2009 -2014 in the Polish gas sector by the 
Inwestycje Gaz – System S.A. company (subsidiary of the Gaz System SA – the Polish national TSO) 
such as:   
 providing  service of virtual reversible transmission on the Yamal gas pipeline (5.5 billion 
m3/year, Poland - Germany) 
 construction of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście (5 billion m3/year) 
 expansion of transmission capacities in Lasów point of entry (a total of 1.5 billion m3/year, 
Poland - Germany) 
 construction of the interconnector in Cieszyn (0.5 billion m3/year, Poland – Czech Republic). 
 
Thanks to these investments, there is a high probability that Poland will achieve the natural gas import 
independence in 2018, while in 2013 imports from Russia amounted to up to 75%. 
 
 
Adapted from Statistical pocketbook (2015, 72).   
 
 
Expansion of the Świnoujście LNG terminal, construction of new international connections and 
reaching a total independence of natural gas supplies are the main objectives of the new Gaz- System 
SA ten years strategy. The company wants to gain a leading position in the region and expand its 
transmission network to be able to receive LNG deliveries from around the world and transport them 
further to neighboring countries. For this purpose, the national TSO systematically develops the gas 
transmission infrastructure within the country: 1). the Szczecin-Lwówek gas pipeline (188 km) makes 
possible natural gas transmission from a new northern point of entry (the LNG terminal) to the central 
Poland; 2). high-pressure gas pipeline Lwówek - Odolanów (168 km) as key investments within the 
EU supporting the North-South Gas Corridor. Completion is expected the fourth quarter of 2018.  
 
The Gaz-System SA ambition is to create a gas hub, which would allow Poland to act as a regional gas 
trading center. As a part of the 2016-2025 strategy, the company wants to invest annually from 1 to 
1.1 billion PLN. During this time, 2000 km of new and modern gas transmission pipelines in the 
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western, southern and eastern Poland is planned for construction. These investments play a key role in 
the whole country strategy because they will allow for the gas transmission to neighboring countries. 
 
Poland is increasingly likely to become the Central and Eastern Europe gas center. Gaining 
momentum works on planned gas connections with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania, as 
well as finalization of the Świnoujście LNG terminal construction, create a new energy map of the Old 
Continent. Poland will be its strong point. 
 
3 Political analysis: how planned and realized gas import alternatives will strengthen the energy 
security of the CEE countries? 
 
Due to its geographical location and access to the Baltic Sea, Poland may play an important role in the 
regional gas supply diversification projects for the V4 and the rest of Central Europe. Poland's 
geopolitical location allows it to act as a “bridge” between Germany and Russia and between the 
Baltic and the Black Sea. The country aspires to the role of an energy hub for the CEE region striving 
to limit Russia gas supplier dominant position, as it uses raw materials as an instrument of political 
pressure serving the purpose of re-imposing its political influence in the region (Strategia Gaz-System 
2016; Malinowski 2015).  
 
3.1 The LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) terminal in Świnoujście 
 
The terminal for importing and regasification of liquefied natural gas transported by sea to the 
Świnoujście port is the largest and most significant investment aimed at enhancing Polish energy 
security. For Poland, it’s an investment of strategic importance and it allows receiving and processing 
of LNG deliveries by sea from virtually every corner of the world. The terminal is the first project of 
such scale in East-Central Europe and the Baltic Sea region. The expansion of its regasification 
capacities from the current 5 million m3 of to 10 mln m3 annually should provide better access to 
global markets.  
 
The terminal in Świnoujście was officially opened at the end of 2015. The first LNG deliveries from 
Qatar were completed on June 17th, 2016 (in line with a long-term contract with Qatargas), and on 
June 25th -  the first spot delivery from Norwegian Statoil. In the initial  phase of the terminal’s 
operation, Poland will be able to import 5 billion m³/per year of gas by sea annually, which constitutes 
1/3 of country gas demand. The next stage depends on the  gas needs growth, and will provide an 
increase in regasification capacities up to 7.5 billion m³ per year, i.e. approximately 50% of current 
Poland’s annual gas demand. The Świnoujście LNG terminal project includes the following elements: 
 new breakwater on the Baltic Sea, 
 port infrastructure for unloading LNG tankers, 
 Szczecin-Świnoujście connector pipeline, 
 the LNG terminal. 
 
The construction of the LNG terminal has been entrusted to state company Gaz-System SA, while 
PGNiG (state own company too), is responsible for management of LNG  deliveries (PGNiG signed in 
June 2009 a long term contract with Qatargas). Main advantages which are offered by the project 
include:  
 increasing the integration of regional gas markets, 
 enhancing the safety of supplies, 
 enabling access to new natural gas suppliers for Eastern Europe, 
 coordinating regional infrastructure projects, 
 harmonising/standardising the rules applied to the market, 




The construction on LNG terminal is an attempt of creating new routes of gas import for East-Central 
European states. It will play an important role in the regional gas market of the Baltic countries and 
Northern and Eastern Europe. The terminal was constructed according to the best in class standards, it 
has the longest in Europe breakwater, modern system of LNG reception, and the highest safety 
certificates full containment tanks, already tested in other huge terminals (Barcelone /Spain, 
Zeebrugge /Belgium, Boston / USA). The pipeline network at the terminal area is 57 km long, while 
electricity cables length for 470 km. The terminal can receive deliveries from the most modern tankers 
in the world (Q-flex type).   
 
The LNG Świnoujście terminal is an investment impacting not only the Polish market. Although it 
was established mainly for geopolitical reasons, it is important to make a market use of the terminal. 
As the largest LNG terminal in the Baltic Sea, through the expansion of the both domestic system and 
international transmission routes (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia), it can serve as a basis for the 
creation of a regional gas hub for the Baltic region (it is important to note that Baltic republics still 
depended on the post-Soviet gas transmission system)3
 
. The first part of the connection Świnoujście - 
Gdansk of about 300 km length is already under construction. Construction of another pipeline section 
directed towards the Baltic states is also planned. The investment enables overland gas re-export to 
neighboring countries like Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Ukraine. For these reasons, the Świnoujście 
terminal construction will be beneficial not only for Poland but the entire CEE as it will allow for the 
diversification of supply sources and can contribute to lower gas prices in the region. In the future the 
Polish terminal will be part of the North - South corridor, which together with the envisaged Adria 
LNG terminal in Croatia will help to achieve the energy independence of Central - Eastern and South 
Europe.  
In addition, the LNG Świnoujście terminal perfectly matches with new EU’s energy strategy, 
recognizing LNG as one of the most important elements of the gas supplies diversification in Northern 
and Central - Eastern Europe. The EU strategy towards LNG was presented on February 16th, 2016 as 
part of a package of proposals in the field of sustainable energy security (EU, 2016). The strategy 
intends to make the European market an attractive one for global LNG suppliers and facilitate access 
to this raw material for countries being currently depended on the single gas supplier.  
 
3.2 The Baltic Pipe: Poland as  a gate for Norwegian gas for the Baltic region 
 
The Baltic Pipe is another strategic gas transmission infrastructure investment for Poland. The aim of 
the project is to construct a submarine pipeline connecting the Danish and Polish gas systems, “fed” 
with gas from Norwegian fields. The gas pipeline is being considered in relation to the Baltic states, 
but in case of new connections Poland - Slovakia, and Poland - Czech Republic,  would allow both 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe to get access to gas from Norway (The Baltic Pipe may 
become in the future a part of the Scandinavian gas grid). The Czech Republic already receives 
Norwegian gas, but it is passed through the Germany territory. Start-up in the near future of the Nord 
Stream 2 (NS2) may de facto lead to the situation that almost all Czech deliveries would depend on the 
German gas transition system. Therefore, the Czech Republic and Slovakia may be even more 
interested in other than Russian gas supply sources.  
 
A gas connection between the Polish and the Danish networks would present an opportunity to 
diversify sources and routes for gas in Europe by connecting transport systems in the Baltic region 
with the rest of the European Union. The Baltic Pipe could be also connected to the LNG Świnoujście 
Terminal. In this way, it will support the North-South Gas Corridor and the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan Corridor, which are considered as a development priority for the energy 
infrastructure of the EU. The advantages of this connection are:  
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 supplying gas from the Norwegian continental shelf to Poland, 
 connecting the LNG Terminal in Świnoujście, which would present access of the 
Scandinavian states to the rest of the V4 countries through the Polish industrial infrastructure, 
 reinforcing the concept of inter-systemic connections between North and South Europe. 
 
There is still the question of costs of this investment. However, the project will be co-funded from the 
Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E) programme.  
 
3.3 North-South Gas Corridor perspectives   
 
Poland advocate the construction of the North-South Gas Corridor, planned to connect the LNG 
terminal in Świnoujście through the south of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary the 
proposed Adria LNG terminal in Croatia (Krk island). The gas corridor construction is going to be the 
foundations for a regional system of gas routes connecting Poland with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary as well as new EU member states of the Mediterranean Sea. The North – South Corridor will 
not be a separate gas pipeline, but rather a combination of existing and expanded internal transmission 
systems of individual countries.The corridor will consists of many two-way inter-systemic gas 
connections and national pipelines which already exist or are in different stages of their construction.  
 
Changing the decision by the Croatian government to build the floating LNG terminal could accelerate 
its completion. Changing the business model can facilitate investment due to lower costs, which still 
are main obstacle in the  project implementation. Raw material from the Croatian terminal would be 
dedicated to the Balkan countries markets, which currently are poorly diversified in terms of gas 
supply routes, but possibly would also supply natural gas to Central European markets, such as Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, and Slovenia (via Baumgarten point of entry).  
 
If North-South gas corridor is completed, it will allow for the integration of regional gas markets, and 
by providing access to new raw material sources in the north and south of the continent will increase 
the energy security and economy competitiveness of the entire Central and Eastern Europe. The 
corridor will provide greater coordination of regional infrastructure projects, and gradually contribute 
to unification of gas markets functioning rules. Thus will be a practical implementation of European 
Energy Union, finally leading to elimination of gas curtain that was historically dividing “old” and 
“new” Europe. Additionally, integration of national gas transmission networks will enable the 
implementation of regional prevention and emergency procedures to be applied in a case of crisis, 
either result from natural disaster, as well as political and economic problems. 
 
 
4 NS2: Russian response to the Polish strategy of regional gas supply diversification   
 
The only but strategic source of gas deliveries into Poland that is not controlled by Russia is the LNG 
terminal in Świnoujście4. To-date, the Polish gas system, on account of historical aspects, was 
adjusted to the transmission of the fuel from the east to the west. The Polish diversification strategy of 
natural gas supplies may break the monopoly of Russian deliveries in the region and may be 
conducive to making Poland an important player in the gas market in this part of Europe. Therefore, 
Russia is trying to undermine the role of the Polish LNG terminal by taking plans on construction of 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is going to fill the German market with gas from Russia (bringing an 
increase in throughput of the Baltic gas transmission system from Russia to Germany by 55 billion m3, 
up to 110 billion m3 per year in total). Gazprom activities – aimed at diversification of gas 
transportation routes  (Miller 2016) in practice lead to saturation of the European market with the 
Russian gas. In consequence this can marginalize operational capabilities of the Świnoujście LNG 
terminal (Dąbrowski et al.). The surplus supply of gas will lower the product’s prices and the cheap 
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gas from Russia will hinder the development of the independent gas market in Central and Eastern 
Europe5
 
. The European market will gain access to a significant volume of cheap gas, yet not to new 
sources of supply, which will solidify Russian’s advantage in price negotiations. 
Thanks to the supplies of liquefied gas, Poland could neutralise the impact of Gazprom; however, it is 
feared that the gas that will be transported to Germany via Nord Stream 2 is not going to be sent 
further to the west, but will be redirected to the CEE  countries. The raw material from Nord Stream 2 
will be sent, via the new German gas pipeline, EUGAL/OPAL 2 with the length of 485 km, to Austria 
(Baumgarten), as well as to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which will become the most probable 
route for distribution of gas from NS2. Therefore, Germany is going to reinforce its role as the gas 
distribution centre for the CEE region. Even though the V4 countries as well as Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Romania and Croatia sent a letter of protest to the European Commission pointing out that the 
construction of Nord Stream 2 poses a threat to energy safety in Central and Eastern Europe, yet in a 
long-term perspective, the lower price of gas from NS2 may undermine Polish efforts at development 
of LNG market in the CEE. Implementation of Nord Stream 2 will also reduce the role of Ukraine, 
which is going to lose significance as a transit state for the Russian gas to the European Union and will 
solidify Gazprom’s monopoly in the region. The construction of the NS2 pipeline also undermines 
Poland’s significance as a transit country (the Yamal–Europe gas pipeline running across Russia, 




Russia is and will remain an important exporter of natural gas to Europe; however, an extension of 
LNG terminals in the Baltic Sea will increase the CEE countries energy safety and will allow a more 
flexible gas import policy. LNG already plays a key role to play in ensuring the diversity, reliability 
and competitiveness of the gas system. Most LNG regasification capacity is found in Western-Europe, 
at the same time the most vulnerable countries from CEE which are mainly dependent on one supplier 
with no or insufficient access to LNG as a potential diversification source either directly or through 
neighboring countries.  Therefore, European gas companies should invest in the development of the 
gas infrastructure along the north - south axis, from the Polish LNG terminal to its counterpart in 
Croatia. Enhancing regional cooperation by ensuring better access through interconnections, will 
strengthen energy security in CEE countries. The countries in the Baltic region and south-eastern 
Europe which are highly dependent on Russian gas, and hence extremely vulnerable to interruptions, 
could substantially reduce imports of Russian gas by the early 2020s, by a combination of LNG 
supplies and pipeline gas interconnections.  
 
Poland has been consistently implementing its plan for becoming independent in  respect to gas 
supplies. Two-thirds of Polish natural gas demand can be covered by sources other than Russian gas. 
The LNG terminal will increase not only the country energy safety, but as well the Baltic and V4 
states. Obviously, buyers in Poland like anywhere else will buy the cheapest available feedstock, 
which is Russian gas. However, the key is to have access to alternatives as it allows to make an 
attempt of putting the gas contracts with Gazprom on a market basis. In the long-term, the Świnoujście 
LNG terminal may become one of the pillars for gas safety in the CEE, being a key point of the North-
South corridor. Thanks to it Poland may become an active participant in the new gas layout in Europe. 
Access to the global LNG market also opens great opportunities for the Polish economy with respect 
to natural gas trading and may significantly contribute to the strengthening of Poland’s position - 
which aspires to the role of the regional energy hub and natural gas distribution centre - on the 
European gas trade market.  
 
Irrespective of this, the construction of the Nord Stream (1 and 2) pipelines from Russia to Germany 
on the Baltic bed substantially reduced Poland’s role as a transit country in transporting energy raw 
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materials. Russia aims at undermining Poland’s role as a regional gas distributor from the LNG 
terminal by causing the excessive supply of natural gas sent via Germany to the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. This is aimed at blocking the competitiveness of the Polish LNG terminal and undermining 
profitability. In this way, Russia successfully undermines European efforts for de-politicization of its 
gas relationships. On the other hand, NS2 may prove beneficial for consumers because it will lower 
the gas price in this part of the EU. In the long-term increase in the sources of supply increase the 
competitiveness of the market. Therefore, diversification is the best tool to bring benefits to consumers 
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1 Countries making up the European Union before the accession of new members in 2004 and 2013: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
2 In 2014, pipeline import capacity to the EU stood at 490 bcm/a and LNG import capacity at 197 bcm/a. 
3 Lithuania is using a floating type LNG terminal in Klaipeda but it has a very limited regasification capacity.  
4 Even the import from Germany is based on the supply from the Nord Stream pipeline, which further feeds the 
OPAL pipeline along Poland’s western border. 
5 Gas prices in the Baltic states and the CEE are approx. 20% higher than in the western part of the European 
Union. Usage of the LNG gas will allow for significant reduction of such prices.   
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